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COMMENTS

A PROPOSAL FOR DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS
FOR CRIMINAL CASES IN ILLINOIS
The trend in criminal jurisprudence is away from the old

"sporting theory"' of justice toward a system which eliminates

surprise and allows the parties to prepare adequately. 2 The
criminal trial is a search for truth, intended to acquit the innocent as well as convict the guilty.3 Society's interest in the criminal process extends beyond convicting criminals to the
integrity of the judicial system. 4 It is undisputed that a pretrial
disclosure of facts encourages adequate preparation, an efficient, orderly trial, and an accurate disposition.5 Because discovery is the process used to disclose facts prior to trial,
society's interest in efficient, accurate trials requires its use in
1. The sporting theory placed emphasis on frustrating mutual knowledge and the orderly presentation of facts, thereby muddling the issues,
confounding jurors and resulting in a distrust of litigation. Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 15 J. MAR. L REv. 1, 2 (1982).

2. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973) (increased discovery is
premised on belief that justice will be served by liberal discovery); Gregory
v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (trend in criminal law is
toward elimination of surprise and discovery of facts prior to trial), afd
after remand, 410 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969). See
also Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own
Statements in the Federal Courts, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1957).

3. "A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth. That
quest will more often be successful if both sides have an equal opportunity
to interview the persons who have the information from which the truth
may be determined." Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
4. "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
5. The goal of pretrial discovery is promotion of the fact-finding process and elimination of the advantages of surprise by either side. People v.
Childs, 95 111. App. 3d 606, 420 N.E.2d 513 (1981). Discovery is to protect defendants against surprise, unfairness, and inadequate preparation as well
as afford the defense the opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the case. People v. Miles, 82 III. App. 3d 922, 926, 403 N.E. 2d 587,
591 (1980). See also Zagel & Carr, State CriminalDiscovery and The New

Illinois Rules, 1971 LAw FORUM 557, 560; 1978 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, 11-1.1(a) (iii); infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
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6
the criminal area.
Illinois has specific rules which establish guidelines for
criminal discovery, 7 but these rules, unlike their civil counterparts, do not allow complete discovery; discovery depositions
are barred because they allegedly increase costs, harass witnesses, and create constitutional problems. 8 Discovery depositions, however, would improve the criminal justice system by

improving pretrial preparation, thus facilitating accurate, efficient dispositions. Questionable dispositions compromise the
integrity of the criminal system. Discovery depositions will provide both the state and defendant with an efficient fact-finding
tool which will streamline the system while sustaining its integ-

rity.9 Defendants desperately need discovery depositions to
close the gap between their fact-finding abilities and the state's

vastly superior investigative powers. 10 It is illogical to give civil

defendants better tools to protect their property than are given
criminal defendants in protecting their lives and liberty. Beyond the practical benefits of discovery depositions, denying
right to due process" and
their use may violate a defendant's
12
effective assistance of counsel.
DISCOVERY IN ILLINOIS

3
Discovery is a relatively new concept in the United States,'
not implemented until the late 1950's and early 1960's. While a

6. For views favoring liberalized discovery, see Brennan, The Criminal
Prosecution; Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279;
Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L REV. 163 (1963); Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J.
477; Louisell, CriminalDiscovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?,49 CALIF. L
REV. 56 (1961); Nakell, CriminalDiscovery For The Defense and The Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations,50 N.C.L REv. 437
(1972); Norton, Criminal Discovery: Experience Under The American Bar
Association Standards, 11 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 661 (1980); Pye, The Defendant's
Case For More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82 (1963); Zagel & Can, supra
note 5; Note, A ProposalFor ProsecutorialDiscovery Depositions in California, 14 SAN. DIEGO L REV. 936 (1977); Comment, Discovery Depositions: A
Proposed Right for the CriminalDefendant, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 467 (1978);
Comment, Depositions as a Means of CriminalDiscovery, 7 U.S.F.L REV.
245 (1973).
7. See L.. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(a) (1981).
8. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 114-142 and accompanying text.

12. See infra notes 143-157 and accompanying text.
13. The major federal cases which discuss the merits of discovery are:
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399" U.S. 78
(1970); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957); and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See also Zagel &
Carr,supra note 5, at 559.

19831

Discovery Depositions

number of states have recognized the value of discovery depositions and have provided for them by statute, 14 prior to the early
1970's, criminal discovery in Illinois was based on cases and
scattered statutes. 15 Although the Illinois General Assembly
specifically provided in 1964 that discovery procedure in criminal cases was to be in accordance with the rules of the Illinois
Supreme Court, 16 the court did not exercise this rule-making authority until 1970 in People v. Crawford.17
In Crawford, a divided appellate court held that the trial
court has the inherent authority to order discovery in criminal
cases. 18 On appeal, the state did not contest the merits of the
court's power to order discovery, but merely argued that discovery should not develop on a case-by-case basis, 19 resulting in inconsistencies among the different circuits and districts in
Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court entered an order appointing a committee to draft rules for discovery in criminal
cases and remanded the case with instructions to proceed in ac20
cordance with the new rules.
The rules drafted by the Committee on Discovery and Procedure Before Trial in Criminal Cases (the Committee) apply
only following indictment or information and not prior to, or in
the course of, any preliminary hearing,2 1 and to cases which may
14. See, e.g., 17 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN., Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
15.3 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3.220(d) (West 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 545.380-545.400 (Vernon 1953); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13 (1974); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 .(1953); TEX. CODE CRm. Pnoc. ANN. art. 39.02

(Vernon 1966 &Supp. 1978); VT. R. CRm. P. 15 (1974).
15. See, e.g., People v. Holiday, 47 Ill.2d 300, 304, 265 N.E.2d 634, 636
(1970) (dictum that defendant can discover names of all occurrence witnesses); People v. Sumner, 43 Ill. 2d 228, 252 N.E.2d 534 (1969) (state withholding of prior statement of witness denied defendant due process);
People v. Cagle, 41 IM.2d 528, 244 N.E.2d 200 (1969) (an accused is entitled to
production of a document that is contradictory to the testimony of a prosecution witness); People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966) (a
defendant is entitled to have expert witnesses examine physical evidence
prior to trial); People v. Neiman, 30 IM. 2d 393, 397, 197 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1964)
(prosecution must furnish statements made by state witnesses); People v.
Wolff, 19 MI. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960) (grand jury testimony and other
statements are available for impeachment at trial); People v. Endress, 106
Ill. App. 2d 217, 245 N.E.2d 26 (1969) (trial court has authority, absent specific rules of Illinois Supreme Court, to provide for pretrial discovery of
items of physical evidence which the prosecution will introduce at trial).

16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-13 (1981).
17. 114 Ill. App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d 483 (1969), remanded with instructions, No. 42801 (Sept. 3, 1971).
18. People v. Crawford, 114 M1.App. 2d 230,235,252 N.E.2d 483,485 (1969).
19. See Zagel & Carr, supra note 5, at 575.

20. People v. Crawford, No. 42801 (IlM. Sept. 3, 1971), remanding 114 Ill.
App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d 483 (1969).
21. ILL.. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 411 (1981). Cf. People ex rel. Fisher v.
Carey, 77 Ill. 2d 259, 396 N.E.2d 17 (1979) (police report is subject to sub-
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result in imprisonment in the penitentiary. 22 Upon written motion, a defendant may receive the names and last known addresses of all witnesses whom the state intends to call, along
with their written or recorded statements. The defendant is also
entitled to statements by the accused or a co-defendant and a
list of witnesses to such statements, grand jury transcripts, any
experts' reports, test results and statements, any books, papers,
documents, photographs, or tangible objects obtained from the
accused or to be introduced at trial, any record of prior criminal
convictions of persons whom the state intends to call as witnesses, information of any electronic surveillance of the defendant, and any other information which tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or reduce the possible punishment. 23 The defendant is also entitled to a list of those witnesses whom the state
intends to call to rebut any defense which the defendant intends
to assert.24
At present, the prosecution is entitled to extensive discovery from the defendant. The defendant may be compelled to appear in a line-up, pose for photographs, provide handwriting
samples, try on articles of clothing, or permit taking of fingernail
scrapings, samples of blood, hair and other materials which do
25
not involve an unreasonable intrusion of the defendant's body.
The state is entitled to any reports, test results, and related testimony of any experts concerning such reports and tests which
poena duces tecum prior to preliminary hearing, but subsequent to charging of accused).
22. ILj REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 411 (1981). The main factors in limiting
the discovery rules to cases where imprisonment was possible was the substantial volume of less serious cases and the delay discovery would cause in
those cases, and the desire to minimize variances in the scope of discovery
permitted. People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572, 573, 309 N.E.2d 557, 558 (1974).
See also People v. DeWitt, 78 Ill. 2d 82, 397 N.E.2d 1385 (1979) (discovery
does not extend to probation revocation hearings).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 412(a), (b), (c) (1981). See also Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (state must disclose to the defense any material which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or which would reduce
pUnshment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring the defendant to appear in a line-up does not violate the privilege against selfincrimination); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (the power of
the state to require the defendant to give blood samples does not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 413(d) (1981). The constitutionality of this
portion of the discovery rules was brought into question in light of Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), which held that the defendant must have a
reciprocal right of discovery of state witnesses called to rebut the defendant's alibi. In People ex rel. Carey v. Strayhorn, 61 III. 2d 85, 329 N.E.2d 194
(1975), the court construed the words "subject to constitutional limitations"
to include the requirement of Wardius and held that the rule is broad
enough to require the state to disclose the names and addresses of rebuttal
witnesses.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 413(a) (1981).
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are to be introduced at trial. 26 The defendant must inform the
state of any defenses intended to be made at trial, the names
and addresses of witnesses whom the defendant intends to call
along with relevant statements and any known record of convictions of those witnesses, and of the existence of any books, papers and tangible objects which the defendant intends to use as
evidence. 27 Like the defendant, the state may move for disclo28
sure of information not covered by the rules.
The court has discretion to order disclosure of information
not specifically covered by the rules upon a showing of materiality,29 or deny disclosure of any information covered by the rules
if it finds that a substantial risk of physical harm, intimidation,
bribery, economic reprisals, or unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment to any witness outweighs any usefulness of disclosure to the defense. 30 The rules impose a duty upon the state to
take reasonable measures to ensure that it acquires the information amenable to discovery, 31 but exclude from discovery the
state's work product, the names of informants, and information
32
kept confidential for national security reasons.
The only depositions allowed in criminal cases in Illinois are
evidence depositions, which are taken only in the very limited
circumstances 33 in which a deposition is necessary to preserve
testimony because the court has decided there is a substantial
possibility that the deponent will not be available at trial.34 The
Committee reasoned that evidence depositions are necessary to
preserve evidence, and that their rare use would not create administrative problems. 35 Discovery depositions on the other
hand would be too time consuming and costly and could be used
to harass impartial witnesses.
26. Id. at § 413(c). The defense must supply the state with statements
of experts only if the defense intends to call the expert at a hearing or trial,
or to use the reports at hearing or trial. People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill.
2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57, 58-59 (1976).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 413(d)(i)-(ii) (1981).
28. Id. at § 413(e).
29. Id.at §412(h).
30. Id.at § 412(i).
31. Id.at §§ 412(d),(f).
32. Id.at § 412(j)(i)-(iii).
33. Id.at § 414.
34. Id. at §§ 414(a),(e). See also People v. Malone, 41 Ill. App. 3d 914,
919, 354 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1976).
35. 'The Committee chose not to include depositions for discovery purposes, but did decide to follow the unmistakable trend and provide for depositions to preserve testimony." ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 110A, § 414 (Committee
Comments October 1, 1971) (Smith-Hurd 1976). See Zagel & Carr, supra
note 5, at 589.
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Further, state depositions of defense witnesses would create constitutional problems with self-incrimination. The Committee erred, however, in rejecting discovery depositions; it
failed to recognize the numerous advantages and benefits which
discovery depositions could provide to the system. 36 A closer
look at the advantages of discovery depositions shows that the
arguments against them are often specious, and even when
sound are outweighed by the advantages of depositions.
THE ADVANTAGES OF DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS

Benefits to the Judicial System
Discovery has developed in both criminal and civil cases because it promotes greater knowledge of the facts, thereby eliminating surprise, weeding out groundless suits, narrowing issues,
and facilitating the presentation of evidence. 37 These benefits
expedite litigation and reduce its cost; they also promote accurate verdicts which sustain the credibility of the judicial system.
Discovery depositions are the best means of fully realizing the
benefits of discovery. 3 8
Discovery depositions will increase plea agreements and decrease collateral attacks and reversals. Once both sides are fully
aware of the opposition's case, there will be a more equitable
plea agreement. 39 Prosecutors will dismiss cases if greater pretrial discovery reveals the futility of proceeding to trial because
36. The purpose of discovery is to promote the judicial search for truth
by giving the defendant access to evidence which he might use on his own
behalf, thereby facilitating the presentation of all relevant, unprivileged,
and favorable evidence, and obtaining a fair decision on the merits of the
case. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to
Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (October 1980) [hereinafter cited as

ABA Project]; Johnston, supra note 1, at 3. See also Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970).
37. Adequate pretrial preparation is a critical element in assuring a successful defense or prosecution. F. BAILEY &H. ROTHBLATr, INVESTIGATION
AND PREPARATION OF CRMNAL CASES § 1 (1970); Johnston, supra note 1, at
4.
38. Unquestionably, the oral deposition is the most effective device in
civil discovery. It combines all the benefits of written interrogatories
and motions to produce documents with the spontaneity and flexibility
of cross-examination ....

The deposition is, however, available to the

prosecution through the grand jury and other procedures. It is essential to effective criminal defense discovery, which in turn is essential to
assure defendants a fair trial.
Nakell, supra note 6, at 450.
39. If pretrial discovery shows that a defense is contrived or fabricated,
a defense attorney should try to persuade his client to enter a plea of guilty.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105-06 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See
also Norton, supra note 6, at 667.
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of a weak case or because the accused is innocent. 4° A guilty
defendant will be more likely to plea bargain upon learning of a
strong state case because, in most instances, the sentence will
be lighter than that imposed after a trial. The importance of ensuring accurate pleas is reflected in the fact that an estimated
ninety (90) percent of all convictions in the United States result
from guilty pleas.4 1 Discovery depositions provide a complete
pretrial factual record, promoting accurate pleas. 42 A complete
factual record will also reduce collateral attacks because most
are the direct result of a lack of adequate information and pretrial preparation. 43
Beyond improving discovery, there are a number of qualities which inhere to depositions alone which would improve the
criminal justice system. In a deposition, the parties are able to
observe the veracity and demeanor of each witness and to draw
conclusions as to that witness' credibility;4 the key to the
strength of that witness' testimony.45 Only after interviewing a
witness can it be determined if that witness is presentable and
articulate. Depositions also provide the parties with more accurate facts than police reports.46 Personal interviews avoid the
inevitable distortions which occur with secondhand information;47 the parties will no longer have to rely on the veracity and
thoroughness of police reports. Depositions will greatly improve
40. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105-06 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concur-

ring). See also Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in CriminalDiscovery, 53
A.B.A.J. 732, 734 (1967); Osburn, PretrialDiscovery Under the Oregon Criminal ProcedureCode, 10 WnjAEmrE L.J. 145, 160-61 (1974).

41. D. NEWMAN,
TRrAL

THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WrrIHoUT

3 n. 1 (1966).

42. If a defendant has an overly optimistic view of the facts of a case, it
may lead to a wasteful trial. A pessimistic view may lead to a premature
Ylea which is subsequently challenged. 1978 ABA Standards For Criminal
ustice, 11-1.1, Commentary.
43. "The profusion of collateral attacks upon convictions may be a direct result of the lack of discovery." Zagel & Cart, supra note 5, at 557.
44. Note, A ProposalforProsecutorialDiscovery Depositions in California, 14 SAN DiNGo L. REV. 936, 955 (1977).
45. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (right to confront witnesses
includes right to have trier of fact observe demeanor of witness).
46. Law enforcement reports are frequently inaccurate or incomplete.
In one case an injustice occurred when the defendant claimed that another
person with the same nickname had committed the charged offense. The
United States Attorney denied in court that such an individual existed.
Through an error in F.B.I. procedures, however, the defendant gained access to normally closed F.B.I. flies which showed that such an individual did
in fact exist. The police officials had never informed the United States Attorney of this fact. See Pye, The Defendant's Casefor More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 88 (1964).
47. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) the Court, stating that
counsel should be present at a preliminary hearing, recognized the principle that an interrogation of witnesses before trial will result in improved
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the quality and quantity of information obtained through
discovery.
Depositions will also allow a better factual presentation at
trial.4 Without depositions, attorneys avoid certain lines of
questioning because they do not know how the witness will answer;49 the evidence introduced at trial is thus limited to the
knowledge of counsel. With depositions, the fear of unexpected
answers will be removed because more thorough knowledge enables the attorney to present the facts more fully at trial, enhancing the possibility of accurate verdicts, reducing reversals,
saving time and money and improving the credibility of the judicial system.
Another advantage of depositions is that they preserve testimony for trial in circumstances which do not warrant taking evidence depositions. 50 Moreover, it may not be reasonably
predictable whether a witness will be unavailable for trial, and
the witness' absence may destroy the case. Routinely taking
depositions preserves the testimony for trial and removes the
defendant's incentive to delay the trial, hoping that witnesses
will become unavailable or that their memories will fade.
Benefits to the Defendant
The judicial system benefits from discovery depositions, but
the defendant benefits even more; the defendant needs depositions to effectively prepare for trial in the face of the state's
vastly superior investigatory powers. The United States
Supreme Court and a number of commentators have recognized
that the current system is greatly imbalanced in terms of the
abilities of the parties to investigate the facts of a case.51 The
state has extensive discovery powers, including the power to
compel the defense to specify any affirmative defenses. 52 The
cross-examination, will preserve testimony for trial, and provide defense

counsel with improved preparation to develop a proper defense. Id. at 9.
48. The theory behind the adversary approach to criminal justice is that
the advocate will present the best supportive evidence and will thoroughly

examine the opposition's evidence. The better prepared each advocate is,
the better he can perform the adversarial role. Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57
IowA L. Rav. 598 (1972).
49. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1368, at 38-39 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)
(dangers of cross-examination where the attorney does not know the witness' expected testimony).
50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
51. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973). See Kampfe &Dostal,
Discovery in the FederalCriminalSystem, 36 MONT. L. REv. 189, 205 (1975).

52. The ABA Standards promote greater discovery powers for the defense by treating the state's investigatory powers as discovery powers. In
the sense that both discovery and investigations are designed to acquire
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state also has the powers of the grand jury at its disposal. On
threat of punishment for contempt, the state can compel the attendance of witnesses to give testimony or produce unprivileged
documentary or physical evidence.5 3 The grand jury, in effect,
operates as a discovery deposition solely at the disposal of the

state.54
The modern police force, with its advanced scientific facilities and extensive search and seizure powers, is also at the
state's disposal. The police arrive at the crime scene and commence their investigation almost immediately,5 5 and they have
the first opportunity to find and interview witnesses, while the
defendant's investigation commences much later.56 The police
also have the first opportunity to interrogate a defendant after
an arrest, gaining valuable information which could also approximate a deposition if a defendant gives a statement or
confession.
The defendant's investigative abilities are not nearly as effective or complete as the state's. Although a defendant is entitled to interview all the witnesses against him,5 7 as a practical
matter police officers, victims, and most witnesses do not cooperate with defense attorneys.5 8 Depositions will alleviate this
material and information before trial, the investigations are no different

from taking depositions. ABA Project, supra note 36, standard 3.1. See
supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
53. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4 (1981) (stating the powers of the
grand jury in Illinois).
54. The importance of the grand jury as an investigative device stems
from the power of compulsory judicial process, which can, on threat of punishment for contempt, compel the attendance of a witness to give testimony
or to produce unprivileged documents or other physical evidence so long as
it is relevant to the grand jury's inquiry. The investigative power of a grand
jury, however, operates only on behalf of the prosecutor. It is unilateral and
non-adversary and, in essence, the grand jury gives the prosecutor an ex
parte deposition procedure. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 112-4 (1981). The
state's extensive grand jury powers were recognized by the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement, which recommended allowing defense
depositions in criminal cases. United States President's Commission on
Law Enforcement, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 139 (1967).

See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953) (prosecution has power
to detain a material witness in custody).
55. See Nakell, supra note 6, at 439.
56. The defendants have a natural handicap in criminal investigations;
"[by the time ...they are called upon to prepare a defense.. ., the prosecution has already tried to acquire ... all of the evidence." Id. at 463. See
also F. BAILEY &H. ROTHBLATr, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMI-

CASES § 2 (1970).
57. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187-88 (1966) (both sides have
equal right to interview witnesses to a crime and should have equal
opportunity).
58. People v. Mason, 301 111. 370, 378-79, 133 N.E. 767, 771 (1921) (prosecution witness need not grant an interview to defense counsel unless he
chooses to do so); People v. Lewis, 112 II. App. 2d 1, 6-7, 250 N.E.2d 812, 815
NAL
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problem by giving the defendant the ability to depose police officers, victims, and witnesses.
The defendant also does not have the right to subpoena witnesses to appear before a grand jury,59 nor can the defendant
cross-examine any grand jury witnesses. 60 The written statements and arrest reports tendered to the defendant under the
current discovery rules are insufficient for fact-finding or crossexamination; 6 1 the reports are incomplete, inaccurate, lack sufficient detail for impeachment, and are prepared by the police or
state investigators, neither of which are likely to seek information with the defendant's interests or theory of defense in mind.
Only the defense is aware of the defendant's theory of the case
and is able to ask questions geared to elicit information consistent with that theory. 62 The state may also circumvent the discovery rules by not committing pretrial statements to writing.63
All these factors point to discovery depositions as the only effective means of equalizing the imbalance between the state's and
defendant's investigatory powers.
The defendant's need for discovery depositions is further illustrated by the number of cases where the state has been
found to have withheld material evidence which may have exculpated the defendant.64 There are numerous cases where an
intentional or accidental withholding of information by the prosecution has resulted in an injustice to the defendant. 65 These
(1969) (no rule allows the court to compel a witness to be examined in private by counsel for either side). The general inclination of most citizens is
to cooperate with the police. Nakell, supra note 6, at 440.
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4 (1981).
60. Id.

61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. See Nakell, supra note 6, at 453.
63. Even though it is prohibited by the discovery rules,

ch. 11OA, § 412(f) (1981), this activity occurs.

ILL REV. STAT.

64. United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953) (prosecutor failed to disclose that a bloodstained bullet found next to slain policeman was not from the defendant's
gun, but was the same caliber that police officers use); State v. Thompson,
396 S.W. 2d 697 (Mo. 1965) (prosecutor withheld a shell casing which had
been found at the scene of a homicide; laboratory reports showed that the
shell was from the co-defendant's gun); People v. Whitmore, 45 Misc. 2d 506,
257 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (prosecution withheld report which concluded that it was impossible to determine if a button pulled off the attacker's coat came from the defendant's coat).
65. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) (prosecution withheld
evidence that rape victim had a habit of engaging in sexual orgies and had
engaged in sexual relations moments before the defendants arrived); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (prosecutor never disclosed evidence of an
affair between the victim, who was the wife of the defendant, and a third
party); Griffen v. United States, 336 U.S. 704 (1949) (prosecutor withheld a
knife which had been found on the victim and which was consistent with a
self-defense claim); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (pros-
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cases all illustrate that for a variety of reasons the prosecutor is
not the proper party to entrust with the responsibility of deciding what information the defendant needs to adequately defend
himself. The defense attorney is the only one who knows what
information will be consistent with his theory of the case and
should be given direct access to all witnesses through discovery
depositions.
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIScOVERY DEPOSrTIONS
The opponents of discovery depositions argue that depositions would result in increased incidents of perjury, bribery and
intimidation of witnesses, would be too time-consuming and
costly, would overly burden witnesses, and would prevent the
prosecution from deposing defense witnesses because of the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and

the attorney/client privilege.6

Depositions allegedly increase

perjury, intimidation and bribery because a party armed with
advanced knowledge of the adverse party's case will bribe or intimidate witnesses into providing testimony designed to defeat
the adversary's evidence and legal theories. 67 This argument
overlooks the fact that the risk of intimidation, bribery and perjury exists without depositions because the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses are already available to the
defendant. 68 It also overlooks the fact that the current discovery
rules provide for protective orders where a risk of harassment
ecutor did not reveal that the state had hypnotized an important witness to
jog his memory); Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967) (prosecutor
withheld a laboratory examination of victim's shirt which showed slivers of
wood and glass, indicating he may have been climbing through defendant's
window when shot); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.) (prosecutor
withheld psychiatric reports that defendant was incompetent to stand
trial), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); United States ex tel. Thompson v.
Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.) (prosecution did not disclose that the arresting
officer told the prosecutor that defendant appeared to be intoxicated), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); United States ex tel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F.
Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (prosecutor did not disclose a doctor's report that
the alleged rape victim was still a virgin).
66. State v. Tune, 13 NJ. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (full discovery will provide the defendant with the opportunity to bribe or intimidate
witnesses into perjury). See also Zagel & Carr, supra note 5, at 560; Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732, 734
(1967); Louisell, CriminalDiscovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIM.
L. REv. 56, 57 (1961). Even if, arguendo, there is some validity in the arguments against depositions, the interests behind these arguments are outweighed by the greater concerns of life and liberty and the possibility of
convicting the innocent. See Case v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346
P.2d 407, 408-09 (1959) (the possibility that increased knowledge may result
in perjury is subordinate to the danger of convicting the innocent).
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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exists. 69 Protective orders would be equally applicable to dis-

covery depositions.
Even without protective orders, discovery depositions
would decrease the incidents of perjury and intimidation, rather
than increase them. If both parties are present at the same deposition, the possibility of abuse is less than in the usual informal
interview.70 The presence of both parties will assure proper attorney conduct and hinder witness tampering. If depositions
are taken early and at the same times, the parties will not have
time to fabricate a story prior to the taking of the deposition or
use the deposition of one witness to change the deposition of
another.7 1 Early depositions will also give each party sufficient
time to verify the respective stories. Depositions will also lessen
the incidents of intimidation because prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence and are admissible
for their truth.72 An accused will have little to gain by intimidating or killing a witness because the prosecution will be able to
use the witness' deposition, 73 and any changes in a witness' testimony may lead to an inference against the defendant.
Further evidence that depositions will actually prevent perjury is the experience in the civil area.7 4 Justice Brennan made
a powerful statement against the possibility of increased perjury
through discovery depositions in criminal cases:
I could not be persuaded.., that the old hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with every suggested change in procedure to make easier the discovery of truth, supports the case against criminal
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 415(d) (1981).
70. ' There are certain inherent dangers to interviewing witnesses
rather than taking formal depositions [such as I the potential danger of being accused of suborning perjury or witness tampering." 4 J. DEMEO, CALIFORNIA DEPOSrION AND DISCOVERY PRACMCE
16.03(2) (1971).
71. The parties can "freeze" the testimony of witnesses at an early date,
and the possibility of impeachment will then deter the defendant from attempting to change the testimony at trial. ABA Minimum Standardsfor
CriminalJustice-A Student Symposium-Louisiana and CriminalDiscovery, 33 LA. L. REV. 596, 599 n.13 (1973).
72. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Using prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence will remove the incentive to intimidate
witnesses since the prosecution can use the prior statement to prove its

case. Zagel &Cart, supra note 5, at 561.

73. If the witness dies, the deposition preserves the testimony for trial
as an evidentiary deposition. See ILL. ANN. Stat. ch. 110A, § 414 (SmithHurd 1979). Even without the right to take a deposition, the state with its
superior investigative powers obtains sufficient evidence to contradict any
perjury. The state's basic investigatory power is clearly superior to that of
the defendant. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
74. See Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60
YAE LEJ. 1132, 1154 (1951) (study of civil practice by Administrative Office
of United States Courts concluded that most attorneys reject contention
that discovery leads to perjury).
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discovery. I should think, rather, that its complete fallacy has been
starkly exposed
through the extensive and analogous experience in
75
civil cases.

The presumption that discovery depositions will lead to increased perjury and intimidation ignores the fundamental principle of our criminal justice system that a defendant is
presumed innocent until proven guilty.76 This principle goes beyond merely placing the burden of proof on the state; it establishes a guideline for criminal procedure. 77 It also requires that
in deciding whether to give defendants the evidentiary means
necessary to protect themselves, it should not be assumed that
all defendants are guilty or that all defendants and their attorneys will misuse information given to them. 78 Because a defendant is presumed innocent, he must know nothing of the
crime charged and should be given exhaustive tools to investigate the facts of a case.
A further argument against discovery depositions is that
they are too costly and time-consuming. Depositions, however,
are more efficient and economical than expensive investigations
and save time and money by saving the costs of unnecessary
trials. The information obtained in a single hour-long deposition
exceeds in quality and quantity the information obtained
through hours of investigations. 79 Because each party conducts
its own investigation,8 0 the cost of depositions must be compared to the costs of two separate investigations. With the less
expensive discovery depositions, the state could shift its funding from investigative agencies to prosecutorial agencies.
Depositions can also make a criminal trial more efficient,
with fewer interruptions or continuances. 8 ' There will be fewer
continuances for surprise because counsel will be more fully
75. Address by Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Symposium at the
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Wash., D.C. (May 9,
1963), reprinted in 33 F.R.D. 56, 62 (1964). "The possibility that a dishonest
accused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing the
injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself.
That argument is outworn; it was the basis for the one-time refusal of the
criminal law to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at all." 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
76. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
77. H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRImiNAL SANCTION 161, 167 (1968).
78. Nakell, supra note 6, at 446.

79. Comment, Depositions as a Means of CriminalDiscovery, 7 U.S.F.L.
REV. 245, 251 (1973).
80. In the case of indigent defendants, the cost of both investigations

falls on the state. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
81. Full and timely disclosure encourages efficiency at trial by minimizing potential interruptions and complications. 1978 ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, Standard 111.1 (a) (iv).
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aware of the facts.8 2 Evidentiary questions which usually arise
in the midst of trial could be addressed at the pretrial stage, and
could then be appealed, before trial, by writ of mandamus or
prohibition, thus reducing the number of cases reversed and retried.83 Discovery depositions will also encourage an open-file
policy, saving time and money. 84 Since the information is obtainable by deposition, the state may voluntarily open its fies. Previously uncooperative witnesses may grant interviews if they
know they will be subpoenaed and forced to cooperate.
Discovery depositions are also alleged to discourage witness
participation. Requiring witnesses to appear for depositions in
addition to trial will supposedly overburden witnesses, discouraging them from coming forward, and destroying valuable
sources. Attending depositions is no greater burden than testi85
Witfying at a preliminary hearing or before a grand jury.
nesses are subjected to such inconveniences in civil suits, and it
makes little sense to inconvenience witnesses in civil cases
more than witnesses in criminal cases when the criminal defendant's interests are much greater. Even if there is a greater
burden on witnesses a slight inconvenience should not prevent
86
a defendant from discovering facts in his defense.
The most common arguments against discovery depositions
87
are that they will give the defendant too great an advantage
and that the state will not be able to use discovery depositions
because of the defendant's right against self-incrimination and
the attorney-client privilege. 88 The state already has a great ad82. Note, A ProposalforProsecutorialDiscovery Depositionsin California, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 936, 963 (1977).
83. See Zagel & Carr, supra note 5, at 560.
84. Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in CriminalDiscovery, 53 A.B.A.J.

732, 733 (1967).
85. Nakell, supra note 6, at 473.

86. Id.
87. "Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
...Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against
him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness
never been able to see ....
to the accused." United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
See also Goldstein, The State and the Accused Balance of Advantage in the
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
88. Norton, supra note 6, at 662. The U.S. Constitution provides that "no
person... shall be compelled.., to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. This privilege is made applicable to the states as part of
the fourteenth amendment's due process requirement. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). The state does not benefit from the due process protections of the fourteenth amendment; there is no required reciprocal right to

discovery by the state if that right is given to the defendant. Due process is
to protect persons, not states. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
323 (1966); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 370 (1939); People v. Williams,
87 Ill. 2d 161, 163, 429 N.E.2d 487, 489 (1981).
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vantage in investigative powers, however, and allowing the defendant to take discovery depositions merely equalizes this
imbalance.8 9 The great discrepancy between the state's investigative powers and the defendant's has led some commentators
to suggest that the only reason that the state does not want the
defendant to have deposition power is that the prosecution's
powers are already so broad that there is nothing which could
be offered them as a tradeoff. °
Secondly, regardless of whether the state should be given
the right to take depositions, the fifth amendment and attorneyclient privilege are not a bar to deposing defense witnesses. The
witnesses to a crime are not the property of either side, and both
sides have an equal right to interview them.9 1 The rights of the
accused are not violated by deposing nonparty witnesses. The
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a per92
it
sonal privilege which inheres to the person, not information
is limited to communicative oral or written statements made by
the defendant.9 3 The privilege does not encompass the list of
witnesses which a defendant must supply to the prosecution
under the current discovery rules, or their testimony.4 Physical
evidence, scientific reports, and witnesses are not protected by
the fifth amendment privilege.9 5
The attorney-client privilege also is not a bar to state discovery depositions. The privilege is narrowly construed and applies
89. If the defendant is not given substantial discovery devices, discovery will remain a one-way street running in favor of the prosecution, and
the defendant is left with a haphazard, expensive investigation. Nakeil,
supra note 6, at 442.
90. Comment, Depositions as a Means of CriminalDiscovery, 7 U.S.F.L.

Rsv. 245, 256-57 (1973).
91. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
92. The privilege is a personal one which cannot be asserted by one individual for another. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2270 (McNaughton rev.
1961); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 120 (2d ed. 1972).
93. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-64, (1966) (the fifth amendment privilege only protects accused from testifying against himself); People ex reL Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382, 385-86, 349 N.E. 2d 57, 59
(1976) (privilege is limited to testimonial disclosure and is to prevent use of

legal process to extract admission of guilt from defendant).
94. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding a notice-of-alibi statute against a claim that it violates fifth amendment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (compelling defendant to speak and to
provide handwriting samples does not violate fifth amendment). See also
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring defendant to appear in
line-up does not violate fifth amendment). Cf. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 609-10 (1972) (fifth amendment allows defendant to remain silent
until he has heard both the prosecution's case-in-chief and his own witnesses). The holding in Brooks effectively precludes the taking of the defendant's depositions.
95. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879

(1962).
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only to communications from the client to the attorney. 96 The
privilege does not extend to information which an attorney
secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation
of litigation, nor does it cover defense witnesses. 97 Experts employed by the defendant may be examined by the prosecution
without an attorney-client privilege violation. 98 All potential witnesses except the defendant are therefore outside the realm of
the attorney-client privilege.
Another argument against discovery depositions is that they
are not necessary because preliminary hearings are sufficient. 99
A preliminary hearing, however, is not a discovery tool, but is
intended to determine if probable cause exists. 10 0 In jurisdictions which use a grand jury, no preliminary hearing is held, no
defense witnesses may be called, and no cross-examination
takes place. 01' The inherent limitations in a preliminary hearing, and the fact that the hearing is not held in every case precludes its use as an effective discovery device.
The falacies in the arguments against discovery depositions
are shown by the only empirical study on criminal discovery
depositions which was conducted for an article written on Vermont's discovery rules,

0 2

which provide for discovery deposi-

96. The attorney-client privilege applies only: (1) Where legal advice of
any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected,
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) unless the protection be waived. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
97. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). See also Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
98. See United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964) (privilege
does not extend to dealings with third parties on behalf of client), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Sachs v. Alcoa, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) (expert
retained by attorney cannot assert attorney-client privilege); People v.
Speck, 41 IM.2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968) (attorney-client privilege does not
extend to experts employed by defense), rev'd in part on other grounds, 403

U.S. 946 (1971).
99. One author noted that a defendant may call witnesses at the preliminary hearing, and a preliminary hearing may thus serve as a form of deposition for each side. This proceeding often provides the defendant with
information to help him determine whether he will plead guilty. See J.
DEMEO, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY PRACTICE 16.03(5) (1971).
100. jC]ross-examination at a preliminary hearing is subject to the
general rule that it may not extend beyond the scope of the direct examination and such further interrogation is directed to show interest,
bias, prejudice or motive of the witness to the extent that these factors
are relevant to the questions of probable cause ....

Clearly, the pre-

liminary hearing is not intended to be a discovery proceeding.
People v. Horton, 65 Ill. 2d 413, 416-17, 358 N.E.2d 1121, 1123-24 (1977).
101. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.

102. Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in CriminalDiscovery, 53 A.B.A.J.

732 (1967).
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tions.10 3 The author gathered information regarding criminal
discovery in Vermont by sending questionnaires to all prosecutors, criminal judges, and defense attorneys in the state. The
principal witnesses in depositions were police officers and eye
witnesses, and depositions were restricted to more serious offenses. Not a single prosecutor, judge or defense attorney indicated that the likelihood of trial increased, and most stated that
depositions decreased the likelihood of trial. The open-fie policy which resulted from Vermont's broad discovery rules also
reduced the likelihood of trial. Discovery depositions removed
the element of bluffing and encouraged defense counsel and
prosecutors to work out a solution to the charge. There was not
a single mention of abuse of the discovery statutes.1° 4 In summation, the article stated:
The parade of "horribles" escaping from Pandora's box as proposed
by the opponents of change in this are numerous. They include
possible intimidation of witnesses, better opportunity to prepare
perjured testimony, harassment of prosecutors and police officers,
extra burden on the prosecution officer, increased costs of the administration of criminal law, etc. The interesting thing shown by
Vermont's experience is that all of these "horribles" are
imaginary.105

The right to take depositions has given the Vermont defendant a
tool with which he can thoroughly investigate the state's case at
minimal expense. After five years of experience in Vermont, not
a single prosecutor, judge or defense counsel called for the repeal of discovery depositions.10 6
The favorable experience with depositions in Vermont is reinforced by the experience with depositions in civil cases. The
only criticism of discovery depositions in the civil context has
been that they are too time-consuming and are often used for
"fishing expeditions." 0 7 Such abuses would not occur in the
criminal context. Criminal proceedings are not initiated without
evidence in expectation that sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction will surface in the discovery process. Discovery is initi103. VT. R. C~am. P. 15(a)-(i) (1974).

104. Langrock, supra note 102, at 733-34 (1967).
105. Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
106. Id. See also Rooney & Evans, Let's Rethink the Jencks Act and Fed-

eral Criminal Discovery, 62 A.B.A.J. 1313 (1976) (experience in those jurisdictions affording liberal discovery has been favorable, without incidents of
perjury, and time-saving).
107. Fishing expeditions occur when the plaintiff initiates a suit without
a sufficient evidentiary basis, hoping to secure evidence through extensive

discovery. See Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United States District

Court, 60 YAE LEJ. 1132, 1154 (1951); Comment, Depositionsas a Means of
CriminalDiscovery, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 245, 251 (1973).
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ated only after an indictment or information; 0 8 a certain
requisite amount of evidence against the defendant is necessary
before discovery begins, and delays because of mountainous
documentary evidence will occur only rarely. 10 9 Discovery depositions in the criminal area, therefore, will not suffer from the
same problems which have resulted in the civil context and are
an even more appropriate tool for criminal discovery than for
civil discovery.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to a practical need for discovery depositions in
the criminal context, denying a defendant the right to take a
deposition may violate that defendant's constitutional rights to
due process" 0 and effective assistance of counsel."' A number
of courts have held that there is no general constitutional right
to pretrial discovery," 2 and others have held that there is no due
process right in a criminal case to depose witnesses." 3 All these
cases, however, were decided before discovery was recognized
as a valuable tool in the judicial process. The recent trend has
been to recognize and broaden a defendant's rights to a pretrial
disclosure of facts.
Due Process
The fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantee a criminal
defendant due process of law. Generally, due process has not
been construed to require a pretrial disclosure of facts, but a few
courts hold that a failure to disclose certain materials and facts
prior to trial is a violation of due process. One decision requir4
ing pretrial disclosure of facts was Jencks v. United States."
Although Jencks was not decided on constitutional grounds, the
commands of the constitution must have been close to the sur108. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

109. Zagel &Carr, supra note 5, at 598.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
112. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); People v. Siefke,
97 Ill.
App. 3d 14, 421 N.E.2d 1071 (1981).
113. See Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559 (1902) (failure of state to provide
method for obtaining depositions of witnesses beyond jurisdiction of state
did not violate due process); People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (1971) (generally recognized that there is no right to take a deposition in a criminal case). See also Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 704 (1980). Weatherford also stated that there is no general constitutional right to pretrial
discovery in a criminal case, but did not give any reasoning for this conclusion. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
114. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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face of the decision."15 In Jencks, the defendant was convicted
of falsely swearing in an affidavit that he was not affiliated with
the Communist Party. 116 On appeal, the defendant alleged error
in the trial court's refusal to order the government to produce
reports made to the FBI by two witnesses against the defendant.1 17 The United States Supreme Court held that justice requires the government to produce, for inspection and
impeachment purposes, all written or recorded reports made by
witnesses which touch the events and activities to which those
witnesses testified at trial;1 8 the government's failure to produce those reports was reversible error. Although Jencks was
clearly limited to production of prior statements solely for impeachment purposes at trial, it did hold that, under certain circumstances, justice requires a pretrial disclosure of information.
The next decision requiring a pretrial disclosure of information
was Brady v. Maryland.119 In Brady, the defendant was found
guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 20 Prior to
trial, the defendant had requested the prosecution to disclose
any statements made by a co-defendant. Several statements
were produced, but one statement, in which the co-defendant
admitted actually doing the killing, was withheld and did not
come to the defendant's attention until after he had been tried,
convicted, and sentenced.' 2' The United States Supreme Court
held that the suppression of this statement was a violation of the
115. Id. at 668-69. Although Jencks was not decided on constitutional
grounds, "it would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution
were not close to the surface of the decision. . . " Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act provided that the
processes of the NLRB will be unavailable to a labor organization "unless
there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed ... by each officer of
such labor organization . . . that he is not a member of the Communist
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in... or
" 29 U.S.C.
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government ...
§ 159, repealed by Pub. L No. 86-257, § 201(d) (1959).
117. The two principal witnesses against the defendant were Communist
Party members paid by the F.B.I. to make oral and written reports of Communist Party activities in which they participated. They made such reports
to the F.B.I. of activities allegedly participated in by the defendant. 353 U.S.

at 659.
118. Jencks was followed by the enactment of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1957). The Jencks Act, not the Jencks decision, governs the produc-

tion of statements of government witnesses for a defendant's inspection at
trial. The Jencks Act clearly limits the production of statements to those
made by witnesses who testify at trial. Id.
119. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
120. "At his trial Brady took the stand and admitted his participation in
the crime, but claimed that [the co-defendant] did the actual killing." Id. at
84.
121. Id.
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due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 122
Justice Douglas reasoned that "[s]ociety wins not only
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair;
our system of the administration of justice suffers when an accused is treated unfairly."'123 A prosecutor who withholds evidence which, if made available, would tend to exculpate a
defendant or reduce the penalty "casts the prosecutor in the
role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
the standards of justice."'1 24 There seemed to have been three
basic public policy propositions recognized in the Brady decision: (1) equalizing the sides will more readily create a fair trial
and reach the truth; (2) fairness is an important element of a
trial; and (3) the ultimate conviction of the accused is not the
paramount consideration.
Wardius v. Oregoni 25 was the next major decision dealing
with pretrial disclosure of information. In Wardius, the defendant was prohibited from calling an alibi witness because he
failed to comply with an Oregon statute requiring the defendant
to disclose the names of the alibi witnesses prior to trial. 126 The
defendant contended that the alibi statute was unconstitutional
as a denial of due process because the statute did not require
the prosecution to disclose the names of witnesses to be called
to rebut the alibi. 127 The United States Supreme Court held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids enforcement of alibi statutes unless a reciprocal right to the names
122. "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. See also Moore v. Illinois,
408 U.S. 786 (1972) (evidence withheld must be material); Clewis v. Texas,
386 U.S. 707, 712 n.8 (1967) (may be a denial of due process for a defendant
to be refused any discovery of his statements to the police); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) (evidence of the mental condition of the complaining
witness was suppressed by the prosecution); Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S.
607 (1960) (the prosecutor suppressed evidence of two eye-witnesses who
could have exonerated the defendant); People v. Burns, 75 Ill. 2d 282, 290,
388 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1979) (failure to provide defendant with requested information which would have created reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt
is constitutional error). Some courts have interpreted the constitutional
duty of disclosure to require that it be made in time for the defendant to
capitalize on it. See United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
123. 373 U.S. at 87.
124. Id. at 88.
125. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
126. See OR. REV. STAT. § 135.875 (1973) (renumbered 135.455).
127. 412 U.S. at 472.
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of rebuttal witnesses is given to the defendant. 128 Justice Marshall recognized the general principles stated in the earlier case
of Williams v. Florida,129that the
adversary system of trial... is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until
played. We find ample room for [a rule] . .. designed to enhance
the search for truth . . . by insuring both the defendant and the
State ample opportunity to investigate
130 certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence.
The Court also recognized that the due process clause has little
to say concerning how much discovery each party must be afforded, but "it does speak to the balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser.' 131 Absent a showing of strong state
interests to the contrary, "discovery must be a two-way
street;"'1 2 the defendant must be given an equal opportunity to
learn the names of the witnesses that the state intends to call to
rebut the defendant's alibi.
Jencks, Brady and Wardius all express a general policy in
favor of pretrial disclosure of facts. The decisions also state
minimal due process requirements for discovery in criminal
cases. The state is not to withhold evidence favorable to the defendant and equal discovery procedures must be provided to the
state and defendant. The state is to ascertain the truth, not just
obtain convictions.
In addition to the minimal due process requirements of discovery, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized a defendant's strong interest in interviewing witnesses
before trial. In Gregory v. United States, 3 3 the prosecutor had
instructed the witnesses, prior to trial, not to speak with the de128. "We hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights
are given to criminal defendants." 412 U.S. at 472.
129. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Williams, the defendant contested his conviction claiming, among other things, that the Florida notice-of-alibi statute
compels a defendant to be a witness against himself in violation of the fifth
amendment. Id. at 79. The Florida statute provided the defendant with reciprocal discovery rights. The Court upheld the notice-of-alibi statute, recognizing the state's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour
defense. " IT] he privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by a requirement that the defendant give notice of an alibi defense and disclose
his alibi witnesses." Id. at 83.
130. 412 U.S. at 474 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970)).
131. 412 U.S. at 474.
132. Id. at 475.
133. 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), affd after remand, 410 F.2d 1016 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969). The defendant was charged with second-degree murder, two robberies, and assault with a dangerous weapon.
The indictment covered two liquor-store robberies. The government's evidence as to appellant's participation in the second robbery, resulting in the
murder of the operator of the liquor store, consisted of three witnesses who
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fense unless he was present. 134 The Court of Appeals reversed
the convictions, holding that the prosecutor's actions denied the
defendant his due process right to interview witnesses. 135 The
court reasoned that witnesses to a crime are not the property of
either the prosecution or the defense. Both parties have a right
to, and should be given, an opportunity to interview witnesses. 136 The court also stated that:
A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth. That
quest will more often be successful if both sides have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have the information from
which the truth may be determined. The current tendency in criminal law is in the direction of discovery of the facts before trial and
elimination of surprise at trial. [Footnote omitted] .137
Relying on Brady, the court reasoned that although there was
no direct suppression of evidence, there was a "suppression of
the means by which the defense could obtain evidence."'138 The
prosecutor's statements to the witnesses frustrated the defense
counsel's attempts to interview witnesses and denied the defendant a fair trial.
In light of the principles expressed in Jencks, Brady,
Wardius and Gregory, denying a defendant the right to take discovery depositions is a violation of due process. Wardius held
that although there is no general constitutional right to discovery, due process does require that the abilities of both the state
139
and the defense to discover facts prior to trial must be equal.
The Wardius Court recognized the state's inherent informationgathering advantage, and stated that, if there is to be any imbalance in pretrial opportunity to discover facts, it should work in
the defendant's favor. 14 Under the principles expressed in
identified the defendant as the robber, and a fourth who stated the defendant was not the robber. Id. at 186-87.
134. "The prosecutor embarrassed and confounded the accused in the
preparation of his defense by advising the witnesses to the robberies and
murder not to speak to anyone unless he were present." Id. at 187.
135. "The defense could not know what the eye witnesses to the events
in suit were to testify to or how firm they were in their testimony unless the
defense counsel was provided a fair opportunity for interview." Id. at 189.
136. Id. at 188.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 189. The court also recognized that Canon 39 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics expressly states: "A lawyer may properly interview any
witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal

action without the consent of opposing counsel or party." Id. at 188.
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. The state's inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that
any imbalance in discovery rights should work in the defendant's favor.
The state has greater financial and staff resources, and the prosecutor has a
number of tactical advantages. He begins his investigation shortly after the
crime has been committed when witnesses are more apt to remember
events, and at the time the defendant begins any investigation, the trail is
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Brady and Gregory, denying the defendant the right to take discovery depositions is a "suppression of the means by which the

defense could obtain evidence."'1 41 Discovery depositions provide a "fair opportunity for interview" 142 and are the only effective method of equalizing the defendant's investigative tools
with those of the state.
Effective Assistance of Counsel

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ...

to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-

fense.' 43 The right to counsel is a fundamental right which is
fully incorporated by the fourteenth amendment,'" and the
sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
effective assistance of counsel. 145 In order to achieve effective
assistance, a defense counsel must confer with the client to ascertain potential defenses and discuss potential strategies and
tactical choices, advise the defendant of his rights and take all
actions necessary to preserve them, make appropriate motions,
do adequate legal research, and conduct appropriate factual investigations. 14 One of the most prevalent areas in which inefnot only cold, but a diligent prosecutor will have removed much of the evidence from the field. The prosecutor may compel people, including the defendant, to cooperate and may compel the defendant to participate in
various non-testimonial identification procedures. The police may search
private areas, seize evidence, tap telephone conversations, and they have
access to vast amounts of information in government files. Also, citizens
will cooperate with the police or prosecutor voluntarily when they might
not cooperate with the defendant. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9
(1973) (citations omitted).
141. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (state
should not interpose obstacles to disclosing facts unless it is interested in
convicting defendants on testimony of untrustworthy persons).
142. Id.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
144. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guarantee of counsel
under sixth amendment was fully incorporated by fourteenth amendment).
See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing right to assistance of counsel not as a sixth amendment right, but as a fundamental right
guaranteed by due process clause of fourteenth amendment); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (individual's liberty has such a unique character that it
merits a particularly high degree of protection; therefore, a defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel).
145. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to effective assistance of
counsel is right that is basic, fundamental and secured to every person by
due process clause); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an
attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate").
146. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See
also People v. Nichols, 27 Mll. App. 3d 372, 327 N.E.2d 186 (1975) (defendants
are entitled to aid of counsel from arraignment to trial; this time of consulta-
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fective assistance of counsel has been found is where the
attorney has failed to adequately prepare for trial. In Coles v.
Peyton,147 a rape case, the court found that counsel appointed
by the lower court did not investigate the reputation of the alleged victim for chastity, did not attempt to learn the identity of
or interview her male companion, and did not attempt to interview a woman who had heard the commotion in an alley and had
called the police. 14 The court found a denial of effective assistance of counsel, holding that counsel must conduct factual investigations and allow himself enough time for reflection and
preparation. 149 Another decision where failure to interview witnesses resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel was Tucker v.
United States. 150 In Tucker, the defense attorney failed to interview a key prosecution witness prior to trial. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that failing to question the manager of the robbed
bank denied the defendant his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. 15 1
Beyond the failure of defense counsel to prepare a case by
their own inaction, a denial of effective assistance has been
found where the state or court has imposed extrinsic barriers to
adequate representation of a defendant. In United States ex rel.
Kimbrough v. Rundle,'1 52 defense counsel was not appointed until the day of trial. The court held that the defendant was denied
effective assistance of counsel because the last-minute appointment of counsel is "functionally equivalent to the absence of
counsel."' 5 3 The defense counsel was, in effect, precluded from
preparing his case, and therefore, the defendant was denied effective assistance. In United States v. Knight,15M defense counsel was allowed only thirty minutes to discuss the case with the
three defendants and was denied any opportunity to interview
witnesses or to investigate the case. The court held that denying defense counsel an opportunity to prepare the case "is so
fundamentally unfair that a conviction resulting therefrom cantion, investigation and preparation is vitally important). Illinois courts have
held that failure to fie pretrial discovery motions is not per se proof of ineffective assistance of counsel, but it can be a violation under certain circumstances. See People v. Williams, 63 IlM.2d 371, 349 N.E.2d 14 (1976); People v.
Stepheny, 46 Ill. 2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970).
147. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
148. Id. at 226.
149. Id.
150. 235 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956).
151. Id. at 240.
152. 293 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
153. Id. at 843. "As a result of this lack of opportunity for consultation
and investigation defense-counsel's participation at trial was necessarily
perfunctory." Id. at 842.
154. 443 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1971).
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not be permitted to stand."'155
According to the principles in Coles, Tucker, Rundle and
Knight, the right to effective assistance of counsel under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments includes the obligation and
opportunity of counsel to adequately investigate the facts of a
case and interview key prosecution witnesses prior to trial.
Where circumstances prevent defense counsel from investigating a case or interviewing witnesses, the defendant has been denied his fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel.
Because only the defense can adequately determine what facts
and information are essential to the defense 156 and most witnesses may refuse to cooperate with the defense, 15 7 the absence
of discovery depositions to criminal cases prohibits defense
counsel from adequately preparing for trial and denies defendants their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION

The current discovery rules in Illinois do not provide for discovery depositions in criminal cases, even though depositions
would reduce the number of collateral attacks and reversals,
save time and money, and promote accurate dispositions. The
opponents of discovery depositions argue that they increase the
incidents of perjury, bribery and intimidation of witnesses, and
that the state will be unable to depose defense witnesses because of the defendant's right against self-incrimination and the
attorney-client privilege. Actually, discovery depositions will
decrease the incidents of perjury and bribery, and the fifth
amendment is not a bar to discovery depositions because the
privilege is narrowly construed to apply to the defendant's statements only and does not apply to defense witnesses. The attorney-client privilege is also not a bar to discovery depositions
because the privilege applies only to communications from the
defendants to their attorneys.
In addition to these benefits, discovery depositions equalize
the investigative abilities of the parties. Under the current system, the defendant is at a great disadvantage in discovering the
facts of a case. This disadvantage is so great that depriving defendants of discovery depositions may violate their rights to due
process and effective assistance of counsel. Recent United
States Supreme Court cases have set out certain minimal due
process requirements for pretrial discovery; the state cannot
155. Id. at 178.
156. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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withhold evidence favorable to the defendant, and the investigative abilities between the state and the defense should be equal.
Discovery depositions will equalize the information gathering
imbalance because it will give defendants access to prosecution
witnesses. Barring discovery depositions also denies defendants their right to effective assistance of counsel. Because the
defense is unable to interview prosecution witnesses, the defense cannot adequately prepare for trial. It is for these reasons
that Illinois should allow discovery depositions in criminal
cases.
James J. Graney

